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bstract
The presence of rationing of financial services in the developing countries is a major obstacle to achieving sustainable growth. In recent years
here have been co-ordinated efforts to increase the level of financial inclusion, i.e. to reduce the supply-side constraints restricting access to finance.
his paper aims to understand household’s latent behaviour decision making in accessing financial services, by analysing an entry level Mzansi
ccount in South Africa. The willingness to access financial services is not taken as given, but it is instead defined by perceptions and attitudes. The
zansi intervention is appealing to individuals with basic but insufficient financial education. Aspirations seem to be very influential in revealing
he choice of financial services and to this end, Mzansi is perceived as a pre-entry account not meeting the aspirations of individuals aiming to
limb up the financial services ladder. 2015 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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t.  Introduction
The issues of financial and economic development have
een a focus of substantial theoretical and empirical litera-
ure. Although there is some controversy over the direction of
ausality in the finance-growth relationship, financial systems
re important for facilitating and maintaining economic growth.
urthermore, financial development is generally accepted to
xert beneficial effects not only on growth but also in terms
f poverty alleviation (see e.g. Beck et al., 2009). The lat-
er further emphasises the importance of finance in relation
o development, particularly when the very nature and func-
ions of financial systems existing in Western economies and
mplicitly embedded in existing theoretical models become an
nadmissible assumption. Traditionally empirical studies inves-∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1772 894542; fax: +44 1772 892906.
E-mail addresses: PKostov@uclan.ac.uk (P. Kostov), TGArun@uclan.ac.uk
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879-9337/© 2015 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. Aigating the financial development relationship to growth have
ocused on financial depth. This fact conforms to an implicit
ssumption of universality and to some extent, uniformity of
nancial systems in terms of their functions. Focusing on finan-
ial depth essentially assumes all financial systems work in
he same way (i.e. possess the same functions) and the over-
ll (growth inducing) impact is simply a measure of magnitude,
 magnitude that can be directly related to a measure of the
evelopment of the relevant financial systems. More recently
nalytical attention has turned to the issues of financial out-
each and inclusion; something often referred to as access to
nance. This is an important conceptual shift with far-reaching
onsequences.
The lack of access to finance in developing economies could,
evertheless, be an equilibrium outcome resulting from imper-
ect market competition. In terms of credit provision, the relevant
heoretical models are the ones explaining credit rationing. The
mplicit assumption of credit to a source for expansion of eco-
omic activity and therefore, growth has, to some extent, biased
nalytical attention towards credit, but many of the underlying
rguments in such models can be readily extended to provision
ll rights reserved.
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f other financial services. Such a one-sided focus in the theoret-
cal literature is, nevertheless, understandable bearing in mind
hat credit has important consumption smoothing function (and
ence can lead to better outcomes in a dynamic context).
In the access to finance discourse, we are concerned with
type 2” rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) where
ome applicants are refused loans altogether despite their will-
ngness to pay the market rate of interest. There are two defining
haracteristics of this theoretical reasoning that transpire in most
mpirical studies related to access to finance. The first relates to
hat the (latent) demand for credit (or general financial services)
s taken for given. The other, which to some degree follows from
he former, is the focus at the supply side.
Let us briefly review the type two credit rationing. There are
wo main sources of this type of rationing, namely hidden action
nd hidden (project) type. Hidden action means that the effort to
scertain the project risk is either too costly, or the project risks
tself is non-verifiable. The former entails the classical transac-
ion cost argument: banks incur similar screening costs, and thus
hey will prefer lending larger credits. In such cases, a credit
ationing equilibrium may arise, because any increases in the
oans create moral hazard effects (in the case of hidden action)
nd adverse selection (in the case of hidden type). At a macro-
conomic level, these negative effects dominate the effect on
he interest rate change and by reducing the profitability of the
anks make it impossible for them to attract sufficient finance
ia deposits. Note that from lenders’ point of view, the hidden
ction problem arises because there is not sufficient informa-
ion about the potential clients. Therefore, the lack of studies
bout the potential demand contributes to this exclusion, since
t prevents lenders from ascertaining the nature of the demand
nd thus the lack of such information creates a hidden action
roblem. Of course, research on the determinants of the latent
emand for financial services in its own cannot eliminate the
roblem since the transaction cost argument will still hold.
Bester (1985) showed that in hidden types model by posting
ollateral borrowers can achieve a separating equilibrium with
o credit rationing. The extent to which this can be achieved,
epends, of course, on the relative availability of collateral.
henever the net worth of such is low, this separation may
till be unachievable (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Given that in a
ypical type of cases of lacking access to finance one is likely to
onsider in a developing country, the availability of any type of
ollateral has to be excluded from the very outset, why do we
ven invoke such an argument? Note, however, that the same line
f reasoning could be applied to any form of ‘third party collat-
ral’ i.e. when a third party provides collateral that eliminates
he hidden type of problem. If one assumes that the demand is
resent, it would be logical for the lenders to jointly provide
uch ‘third party collateral’ in expanding the provision of finan-
ial services. Such an intervention could be beneficial for the
enders if the suppressed demand is existing in that the individ-
al risks faced by lenders will essentially be pooled together into common insurance-like pool, and the aggregate benefits would
xceed the individual lenders’ costs. It is, nevertheless, impor-
ant to stress that if the latent demand that we just assumed is not
here, or it is not as strong as assumed, the above logic breaks
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own. Therefore, studies of this demand are also necessary if
 coordinated intervention designed to overcome the hidden
ype problem is being considered. Implementing such a coor-
inated intervention could prove unsustainable whenever this
atent demand is weak. Nevertheless, there is another theoreti-
al argument in favour of such an intervention. As De Meza and
ebb (2006) show credit rationing implies an infinite marginal
ost of credit to the borrower. A stylised fact of the poor in a
evelopment context, however, is their high-risk aversion. Under
igh and extreme risk aversion, the marginal cost of credit will
educe, which says that in such circumstances, the existence of
emand becomes very suspect. One could nonetheless, hypo-
hesise that one of the drivers for such high-risk aversion is the
xclusion from formal financial services itself, which forces poor
ouseholds to avail to alternative risk coping strategies. This sug-
ests that introducing coordinate intervention can by providing
ccess to financial services reduce risk aversion and therefore,
ia increased marginal cost (for these) ultimately create demand.
his solicits studying demand under such interventions.
The strategies, from a client point of view, to eliminate
ationing discussed in the theoretical models include reducing
he size of the project, postponing its start and saving (to self
nance larger part of the project). Reducing the size of the project
ssumes it is divisible, which may or may not be the case. Since
ost ‘projects’ involving poor ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ would be
ather small, size reduction will have limited scope. Postpone-
ent, on the other hand, will only work if it does not have been
eteriorating effects on the projects net value. Note that one
ay combine these strategies, and such combinations may over-
ome the credit rationing problem. We will argue that whenever
haracteristics that facilitate the above strategies, such as e.g.
ropensity to save and interest in longer-term financial planning
re present within the poor, these indicate the presence of latent
emand.
The general implication of the Stiglitz-Weiss model is that
f banks have a way to distinguish between different classes of
isk, rationing will reduce and disappear. The theoretical sug-
estions of how to reduce and eliminate credit rationing (e.g.
ester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Chan and Thakor,
987; Parker, 2000; Lensink and Sterken, 2002) are essentially
roposing different means to achieve this. Note, however, that
he informal market can be typically viewed as a substitute
or not well functioning formal markets (in the presence of
ationing) and hence should incorporate some of these rationing
voidance means. Note, for example, that informal markets are
ighly segmented. The conventional wisdom views this as a
ay to prevent arbitrage possibilities (and hence an imperfec-
ion). Imposing segmentation can, however, also be seen as a
ype of discrimination among different types of clients, which
chieves a separating equilibrium under conditions of initial
ationing. In simple words, the credit rationing is a type of pool-
ng equilibrium, where all clients get the same conditions), while
eparating equilibria provide means for distinguishing different
lients. Whether the latter arises from a clients’ actions (such as
roviding extra collateral or savings) or by a supply-side initia-
ive (such as intentional market segmentation), the outcome is
ualitatively the same.
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The implicit assumption of the barriers to financial services
rgument is on the supply-side constraint. This is either because
ne may not be able to directly observe the latent demand
or financial products whenever the supply constraints are in
lace or because “those who have access but choose not to
se services pose less of a problem for policymakers” (Beck
nd Demirguc-Kunt, 2008). Relaxing the supply-side barriers
ould, however, bring the potential lack of demand for finan-
ial services to the forefront with important policy implications.
fter all coordinated policy interventions designed to expand
ccess to finance is costly and such costs will need to be com-
ared to the potential benefits. When the barriers to access
re removed, voluntary non-participation reduces these bene-
ts. Hence studying the determinants of demand for financial
ervices becomes an important research question. In this type
f analysis the important question becomes whether exclusion
rom financial services is voluntary or involuntary. It is clearly
nfeasible to try to carry out reliable distinction between these
wo forms of exclusion in the presence of binding barriers estab-
ished at the supply side. There are, however, two cases where
uch investigations could be conducted. One is when individ-
als are transferred into a different environment where such
arriers are not implemented. For example, Osili and Paulson
2008) examined the determinants of financial market participa-
ion among immigrants in the USA and found that institutional
actors have profound effects. They hypothesised that the main
hannel through which these institutional factors affect market
articipation are beliefs. Beliefs, however, are difficult to mea-
ure and in a more general, framework can be represented by
lternative indicators such as values, attitudes, perceptions and
evels of financial literacy. We argue that these have to be con-
idered when evaluating the potential effect of expanding access
o finance. The uptake of new financial services bridging over
xisting barriers will define who will benefit the expanded access
o finance.
Investigations such as this of Osili and Paulson (2008) are
mportant in that they open a totally new research agenda and
llow characterisation of voluntary participation in accessing
nancial services. Transplanting individuals from one environ-
ent to a totally different one may tell us a lot about attitudes and
ulture, but it does not sufficiently well capture the institutional
ramework established in their home country. It would be much
ore useful if the decision to avail to different forms of financial
ervices could be investigated in a more natural environment, i.e.
n a developing country context. This is where the second case
n which such investigation could be conducted arises. Studying
uch financial choices in the latter case could be very useful in
etter characterising what defines financial behaviour and due
o the natural setting of such a study, it can provide even more
seful guides for future policy interventions.
This paper takes a preliminary step in this research quest
onsidering the case of the Mzansi intervention in South Africa.
he Mzansi intervention represents a coordinated roll-out of
nancial services in targeting the poor and vulnerable. Rarely,
s the experience of such an intervention that draws on a linkage
etween private commercial banks and either state-owned banks
r an act of legislation to expand financial access. Furthermore,
h
p
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ament Finance 5 (2015) 34–42
he co-ordinated and wide-ranging scope of the Mzansi inter-
ention provides an opportunity to study the individual financial
hoice in a developing context without the presence of binding
upply side restrictions.
Kostov et al. (2012, 2014a, 2014b) produce some results on
his relationship using a range of variable selection methods,
ut unlike the present paper fail to provide a coherent theoret-
cal model underlying their application. Furthermore we take
nto account possible methodological pitfalls in these previous
pplications.
.  Background
Until the end to the apartheid era in 1994, financial services
n South Africa were predominantly accessible to the non-black
ommunity and therefore, by default excluded the economically
eaker households (Meagher and Wilkinson, 2002). In South
frica, the ‘Mzansi’ account intervention offers a peculiar case
n which commercial banks, and a state-owned financial insti-
ution take a lead role to expand access to financial services.
inMark Trust (2009) cautions that although significant suc-
essful indicators are identifiable with the ‘Mzansi’ account
ntervention replicating this strategy require similar country
evel socio-economic and financial landscape characteristics.
urthermore, the evidence of 1.6 million accounts classified as
ormant within the first four years after the Mzansi account
peration underscores the importance of circumspection and
dentification of the drivers and perceptions of household’s deci-
ion to open and maintain an account.
Following the Financial Service Charter (FSC) policy rec-
mmendations the ‘Mzansi’ account which was initiated in
004 offered entry-level accounts. The intervention was situ-
ted in the broader context of financial services outreach that is
cale (i.e. number of clients), depth (i.e. poorer clients), scope
i.e. wide range of services) and breadth (i.e. reaching differ-
nt social groups). Operating under the broader government
olicy framework of economically empowering the black com-
unity in South Africa, the FSC aimed at providing effective
ccess to transaction and savings financial services. While the
nitiative was not legally backing, consenting financial institu-
ions, through some form of social contract were committed to
xpanding access and providing affordable financial services to
he wider population. Beyond national goals, participating insti-
utions, four main private banks in South Africa (Absa, Nedbank,
irst National and Standard) and a state-owned financial institu-
ion (Postbank) was motivated based upon a consensus of shared
eputational and financial risk.
In terms of depth of outreach, the specific target of the issu-
ng institutions was that 80% of the poorest households, defined
s the fifth segment of the South African living standard pop-
lation, should have effective access to transaction and savings
roducts and services. We investigate a demand side concern –
ousehold inherent motivation in choosing a financial service. In
articular, their financial education background (how financially
iterate they are), opinions on their financial needs, aspirations
nd attitudes. Our central research question is – in what way
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oes these hidden factors (education, perception and attitudes)
ffect the uptake of Mzansi account?
.  Mzansi’s  access  to  ﬁnance  framework
Claessens (2006) identifies four pre-requisites for improved
ccess to financial services, namely; availability, reliability, flex-
bility and continuity of access to financial services. Two of
he four requirements that are availability, and reliability can be
dentified with the ‘Mzansi’ account initiative. Firstly, the worth
nd reputation of the four commercial banks coupled with the
redibility of the state bank naturally invokes confidence of sus-
ainability and non-exploitation in potential clients. Secondly,
he widespread coverage of all the issuing institutions, especially
ostbank, presents potential clients with proximity of a financial
ervice point of transaction either physically or electronically.
roadly speaking the overall aims of the Mzansi intervention
eems to have been reached, although the financial sustainability
f the scheme and therefore, its attractiveness to banks could
e questioned (FinMark Trust, 2009). Initial evaluations of the
zansi intervention have focused on directly inquiring clients
bout their opinion and attitudes. The mode of elicitation of their
otivation, however, could condition their stated opinion. To
etter understand what truly makes a customer go for a Mzansi
ccount; it is preferable to investigate the choice of Mzansi con-
itional on their background. Conventional financial wisdom
ould dictate that the relevant background variables are those
easuring who they are. When access to financial services is
oncerned, these include their financial literacy, i.e. the elements
f their financial ‘education’ and understanding of financial con-
epts. These will differentiate the actual from the stated scope
f the Mzansi intervention. Note, however, that simple compar-
son to the distribution of these characteristics between holders
nd non-holders can to a large extent capture this. The internal
otivation of clients could, however, be measured by their gen-
ral attitude towards financial literacy, namely what they think is
issing from their financial understanding and what they want
o learn. Providing characterisation of the Mzansi choice based
n these internal motivations would not simply complement
he ‘who they are’ characterisation, but would also describe in
ome more detail the realised scope of the Mzansi intervention.
herefore, such an analysis would contribute towards a better
ne-tuning of the actual scope of Mzansi, so that it better reflects
he needs of its customers. This could have twofold benefits.
irst it could go some way in addressing the issue of high share
f inactive Mzansi accounts. Second it would undoubtedly help
anks better target their clients by better differentiating Mzansi
rom their entry level products and hence contribute to achieve
 longer-term sustainability of the scheme. We have briefly dis-
ussed the issues of financial rationing in the preceding sections.
nstead of seeking means to obtain information about the clients
s in all separating equilibria, Mzansi intervention tries to avoid
ationing in a totally different way. It still pools together clients,
oping that the benefits from incorporating ‘good’ clients will
utweigh the disadvantages of including the ‘bad’ ones. Hence
he Mzansi approach aims at pooling equilibrium, rather than
 separating one, as in e.g. micro-finance and informal finance
t
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hannels. In a dynamic view, providing basic services widen-
ng participation in financial markets could be advantageous
n providing further information that banks can use to achieve
eparating equilibria (i.e. to distinguish well with bad clients).
he other potential advantage of such a scheme is the potential
eduction of demand-side rationing. Long-term credit rationing
n the supply side can, however, lead to learning effect induc-
ng demand-side rationing. See, for example, Kon and Story’s
2003) theory of the discouraged borrowers. Hence the presence
f supply side rationing creates transaction costs (e.g. borrowers
now that it will be costly and probably unsuccessful to apply to
he formal sector and can directly approach informal lenders).
n this way supply side rationing leads to demand depression (or
e-allocation to the informal sector) and increased risk aversion,
hich further reduces demand. Mzansi is supposed to eliminate
his demand depression and hence could be expected to have
ynamic learning effects. In this particular study, due to its pre-
iminary and exploratory nature we will ignore such dynamic
ffects, but one needs to be aware of them.
.  Data
The empirical section of the paper relies on the 2007 Fin-
cope South Africa dataset. Finmark Trust launched Finscope
n 2003 in an attempt to establish credible benchmarks for the
se of, and access to, financial services in South Africa. The
im was to achieve a measure and understanding of consumer
emand across transactions, savings, credit and insurance cat-
gories. The sample frame of the Finscope data consists of all
outh Africans aged 16 years and above. The nationally rep-
esentative data is based on enumeration areas and stratified
ultistage sampling technique. The 2007 Finscope dataset was
ollected from 3900 households using face to face interviews
rom April to May 2007. The scope of the data was categorised
nder two broad headings namely, living standard and financial
ervices. The former captures issues such as income, quality
f life, and household demographics, while the latter tracks
ational financial access patterns and pathways in terms of prod-
cts and service providers and household financial decision trees
nd perceptions.
In this analysis, we use 102 variables, grouped in the fol-
owing categories: basic literacy, understanding financial terms,
argets for financial advice, financial education desired and
nancial perception. The full listing of employed variables and
heir exact definitions are available upon request.
Here we will only briefly describe these categories. Basic
iteracy contains a single indicator variable. The understanding
f financial terms category includes 17 variables that quantify
hether the respondents comprehend the actual meaning of a
umber of financial terms, ranging from simple ones such as
ad debt and loan to increasingly more complex ones such
s pieces of financial legislation. One could hypothesise that
lients would need some basic financial understanding in order
o select themselves into the Mzansi intervention, but having
etter understanding would mean that they would not be satis-
ed with the basic features offered by Mzansi and would require
ore sophisticated products.
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The target for financial advice category includes 15 variables
sking whether the respondents would use certain sources in
rder to obtain financial advice. The sources range from informal
nes (such as family and friends) to formal professional type of
dvice providers (such as financial institutions and independent
rokers). Furthermore, some of the sources could be formulated
n such a way that respondents may not properly understand
hem and/or different types of advice sources could be bundled
nto the same category (e.g. “A financial advisor other than an
ndependent broker (e.g. tax consultant, auditor)”).
Further 16 variables describe what type of financial educa-
ion respondents desires. These variables imply the respondents
o not possess this form of financial education. Most impor-
antly, however, they measure their intrinsic aspirations to further
hemselves. People aspiring to obtain further financial education
ould aspire to move up the financial access ladder. Therefore,
ven if their background (financial education) places them on a
articular step in this ladder, their aspirations can provide addi-
ional motivation, and hence they may be motivated to move up.
n this way, they may end up at a higher step, simply because
his is where they (aspire to) belong. Hence this category mea-
ure and quantifies the inherent motivations of banking clients.
ith respect to Mzansi, which is essentially a pre-entry level
ccount, one could hypothesise that most types of expressed
esire to obtain further financial education would move clients
p towards the banks’ entry level accounts and hence have a
egative impact on Mzansi uptake.
Finally, we have two categories of financial perceptions
ariables. These ask people, whether they agree with some
tatements. In this way, the internal motivations and percep-
ions towards financial behaviour are evaluated. The financial
erceptions grid 1 variables ask factual questions about actual
ehaviour, while grid 2 variables refer mostly to attitudes (opin-
on, trust, etc.). Thus, the two categories of financial perception
omplement each other by measuring two facets of the same
henomenon.
.  Methodology
Since our dataset consist entirely of factor variables, a binary
ependent variable type of model is a natural choice within
he modelling framework. In particular, the logistic regression
s a common choice for modelling framework in such situa-
ions. For variable selection, we have used a penalised regression
pproach. Previous analysis of this issue used the Dantzig selec-
or (Kostov et al., 2012), the adaptive lasso method and a range of
ther frequentist and Bayesian regularisation methods (Kostov
t al., 2014b) and considered the uncertainty in the variable
election procedures (Kostov et al., 2014a). There is however
n important methodological issue that needs to be taken into
ccount. When there are groups of highly correlated variables,
omething that is not unusual is empirical studies, most penalised
pproaches tend to (arbitrarily) select only one variable from
ach group. This makes the resulting models difficult to interpret,
ince variables that are strongly associated with the outcome
ay not be included into the model simply because they are
lso strongly correlated with a variable that is included. This
p
d
a
oment Finance 5 (2015) 34–42
ind of difficulty can be illustrated e.g. by the results from
lternative estimators, presented in Kostov et al. (2014b) where
ifferent methods seem to select different variables from each
f the underlying categories. While in some cases since in many
atasets such as in the present ones multiple variables can be
iewed as proxies for a number of underlying latent factors,
ifferent methods selecting different variables from the same
ategories may not impact substantially on the interpretation of
he result, this is by no means guaranteed. Furthermore the lat-
er will only occur if these categories (employed in the results
nterpretation) have been correctly identified. The latter assumes
ome pre-existing knowledge about the structure of the analyti-
al problem, which in many ways goes against the general logic
f a variable selection methods generally designed for structure
iscovery. It is therefore of paramount importance to account for
his underlying correlation structure and in such way to immu-
ise empirical findings against the above undesirable property
f regularisation variable selection methods.
The group-wise least absolute shrinkage and selection oper-
tor (LASSO) can deal with groups of correlated variables, but
t requires that the relevant group are pre-specified. Bondell and
eich (2008) proposed the OSCAR (octagonal shrinkage and
lustering algorithm for regression) approach that performs vari-
ble selection for regressions with highly correlated predictors.
The OSCAR estimator can be formally defined as:
(λ1, λ2) = argmin
β
{
(β) + λ1
p∑
j=1
|βj | + λ2
∑
j<k
max{|βj |, |βk|}
}
here (β) is the corresponding loss function (in this case the
egative log-likelihood for the logistic regression model), p  is
he number of parameters (to be estimated), while λ1 and λ2 are
on-negative penalty parameters (to be tuned).
The OSCAR method can simultaneously perform variable
election and cluster the important variables. It achieves this by
mploying a weighted combination of L1 (absolute deviations)
enalty term
∑p
j=1|βj| and a pair wise L∞  (i.e. maximum)
enalty
∑
j<kmax {|βj|, |βk|}  for the coefficients. The L1 penalty
ffectively shrinks the coefficients towards zero, hence introduc-
ng sparsity and by eliminating unimportant variables performs
ariable selection. The pairwise L∞  penalty, on the other hand,
as the effect of encouraging equality of coefficients by penal-
sing large differences between coefficients. Hence the OSCAR
pproach eliminates unimportant variables, but also groups the
mportant ones in clusters with similar coefficients.
If we set λ2 = 0 the OSCAR estimator reduces to the LASSO
hich produces sparse estimates but no clustering. The effect
f the latter, as discussed above, is that whenever there are
roups of highly correlated variables, the algorithm will tend
o select one variable from each such group. With λ2 > 0, the
rouping effect keeps correlated variables together. Note also
hat with (λ2/λ1)→  ∞, the grouping effect will prevail resulting
n clustering with no variable selection. The exact values to the
enalty parameters, which can be chosen by cross-validation,
efine the nature of the estimator. The theoretical results for
ny regularisation estimator are established with regard to the
ptimal amount of shrinkage (i.e. in this case the optimal
velopment Finance 5 (2015) 34–42 39
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Table 1
Estimation results.
Variable Coefficient
Understanding of financial terms – bad debt 0.147
Understanding of financial terms – garnishee order or
emolument order
0.118
Targets for financial advice – independent broker 1.006
Targets for financial advice – a financial advisor other
than an independent broker (e.g. tax consultant,
auditor)
0.514
Financial education desired – how to make effective
use of technology, such as cellphones or ATMs, to
better manage your finances
−0.402
Financial education desired – how to work out how
much credit you can afford/pay back on
−0.305
Financial education desired – how to select the best
investment products
−0.109
Financial education desired – none 0.511
Financial perceptions grid 1 – you try to save regularly 0.129
Financial perceptions grid 1 – as soon as money is
deposited into your account you withdraw it
0.473
Financial perceptions grid 1 – you go without basic
things so that you can save
0.2373
Financial perceptions grid 1 – you hand over some or
all of your money to a friend or family member for
safekeeping or to guard it
−0.205
Financial perceptions grid 1 – if you do not have
enough money to pay all your debts, you pay one
debt one month and the next month you pay another
debt
0.168
Financial perceptions grid 1 – you have a will or last
testament
−0.170
Financial perceptions grid 2 – when it comes to
money, young people know more than older people
0.127
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alues of λ1 and λ2). Employing cross-validation (or any other
ethod) to select these parameters is, however, very demanding
rom computational point of view, since it will require mul-
iple evaluation of the objective function. This computational
ost can greatly reduce the appeal of such method. It is there-
ore, if methods that circumvent this are available. In particular,
or the introduction of the LARS (least angle regression) algo-
ithm of Efron et al. (2004) have revolutionised regularisation
pproaches. Efron et al. (2004) have shown that the whole regu-
arisation path for the LASSO is piecewise linear and the LARS
lgorithm can compute it for a range of shrinkage values at the
omputational cost of a single least squares fitting. This has
ead into a search for similar fast regularisation path algorithms.
nce such an algorithm is available the repeated optimisations
f the underlying problem are no longer needed. This allows the
mplementation of cross validation to choose the appropriate
hrinkage parameters. Regularisation path algorithms are even
ore valuable when there is more than one shrinkage parameter
as in OSCAR). In this paper, we implement the Local Quadratic
pproximation (LQA) algorithm of Fan and Li (2001) with an
SCAR penalty and use 5-fold cross validation to choose the
mount of shrinkage in both directions (i.e. the combination
f penalty parameters (λ1, λ2)). The LQA algorithm is not as
omputationally efficient as the LARS one, but has the added
exibility that it is universally applicable. While the LARS algo-
ithm is strictly speaking only applicable to a LASSO type
roblems in linear models, it is possible to modify the LQA
lgorithm (which was initially introduced to deal with the SCAD
enalty) to a wide variety of alternative penalty terms and mod-
ls. In this case, we have a logistic regression (generalised linear
odel) with a composite (OSCAR) penalty.
.  Results
The LQA provides us with the regularisation path for the
SCAR estimator of the logistic regression of the choice of
zansi account on the set of 102 variables, described under the
ata section for a range of different regularisation parameters. A
ve-fold cross-validation is then applied to the output of the LQA
lgorithm, and the optimal amount of shrinkage is selected thus
roducing the final estimated model. The latter is summarised
n Table 1, which presents the selected independent variables
i.e. the variables with non-zero coefficients) and their estimated
oefficients.
Out of the 102 candidate variables, only 15 are retained in the
stimated model. Here we briefly summarise the results. Before
e do so however, note the following details about the results
nterpretation. As already discussed since our variables are basi-
ally indicators, they are expressed in the same units which
ean the estimated coefficients are naturally ‘standardised’. I
ddition to allowing for direct application of the OSCAR algo-
ithm this also facilitates results discussion about the sense that
e can directly compare different coefficients in terms of their
agnitude. In this case, the strength of the relative effects will
e directly proportional to the estimated coefficients. In some
ases, however, the fact that given variable is not included in the
nal model (i.e. the lack of impacts) could be an interesting and
s
t
e
feaningful result in itself and could deserve attention. Addi-
ionally, for ease of interpretation we apply boldface formatting
o the negative coefficients, making it easier to distinguish them
rom the positive ones. Let us now proceed with the results.
First, the basic literacy variable does not discriminate
etween Mzansi account holders and non-holders. Since basic
iteracy can be expected to be a pre-requisite to any form of
ccess to finance, it could be expected to discriminate between
ndividuals with and without such access. Note, however, that
ince the individuals without Mzansi comprise of both people
acking access and people who use better than the basic Mzansi
ccess, such a variable cannot differentiate Mzansi holders from
he rest.
Next, two variables from the “understanding of financial
erms” categories are retained. These are Bad debt and Garnishee
rder or emolument order. Bearing in mind that this category
as an almost natural hierarchy from simpler to more complex
erms, the selected terms lie towards the lower end of this hier-
rchy. Therefore, the individuals selecting themselves into the
zansi system only possess some understanding of basic finan-
ial terms, i.e. have a minimal financial education. They need
uch basic understanding in order to be motivated to seek access
o finance. Had however, they possessed better financial knowl-
dge; they would have opted for more advanced forms of access,
rom the basic entry accounts upwards.
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Only two of the variables in the category “targets for financial
dvice” are selected. Since the sample also contains individuals
ith no financial access and such with enhanced (compared to
zansi) access to finance, the model finds it difficult to explic-
tly differentiate between differences that could be attributable
o these two alternative categories. A major reason for this is the
act that in contrast to the “understanding of financial terms” cat-
gory, here it is difficult to find similar natural hierarchy, which
eans that the differentiation of the choice of Mzansi from below
i.e. against no access) and above (i.e. better access) is pooled
ogether. The latter was not a problem with the previous cate-
ory due to the natural hierarchy, but in terms of the sources
f financial advice, the lack of such confuses matters. Further-
ore, it is possible that the wording of the options within this
ategory could be confusing for respondents. The selected vari-
bles are Independent broker and a financial advisor other than
n independent broker. Hence the Mzansi holders seek generally
ndependent financial advice. This excludes family members
nd friends, as well as the providers of financial services. One
ould assume that these (unselected) sources of financial advice
re seen as being more partial. Additionally, the existing basic
nancial understanding pushes then to seek some independence
n making financial decisions. Their financial literacy being just
hat, basic, however, means that they do not feel sufficiently
onfident in judging for themselves advice that can be seen as
eing somewhat biased, and therefore, they prefer a truly inde-
endent opinion. The coefficient for independent broker is by
ar the largest of any explanatory variable. Given that we inter-
ret this variable also in the sense that some kind of impartial
nancial advice is sought, this may look slightly out of line.
emember that the OSCAR algorithm implicitly groups corre-
ated variables and force the coefficient in the same group to
onverge. This obviously has not happened here, which means
hat the two variables in this category are not highly correlated.
ne reason for this could be that there might be a scope of
nterpretation of what the latter variable actually means. In this
ense such as elicitation effects could be translated into different
nderlying meaning for different types of respondents. If we take
nto account that in the actual spelling of the underlying ques-
ion terms such as tax consultant and auditor are mentioned as
xamples, it may appear strange that this variable was selected,
nd that it increases (rather than decreasing) the likelihood of
pting into the Mzansi intervention.
The next category is “financial education desired”. Four vari-
bles from this category feature in our model. One of these makes
he choice of Mzansi more likely, while the other three act in
he opposite direction. First of all, seeking no further financial
ducation makes one more likely to choose Mzansi. What this
eveals is the following: Mzansi holders have reached a level
f financial literacy, but do not strive to move further, they are
appy where they are. The other three selected variables in this
ategory make a decision to choose Mzansi less likely. This
eans that in general looking for further financial educationxpresses desire and aspirations to move further up the financial
ccess ladder. This interpretation is reinforced by the type of
hese three variables. The first of these variables relates to the
ffective use of technology (hence moving into other financial
t
B
b
iment Finance 5 (2015) 34–42
ccess channels such as e.g. mobile banking). The other vari-
ble relates to working out credit repayments. This could show
 desire to overcome debt, but also maybe planning for minor
nvestments. The last variable in this category relates to selecting
nvestment products, which undoubtedly accounts for aspira-
ions far beyond the basic access to financial services offered by
he Mzansi intervention. What is also highly informative is that
hat variables (from this category) are not selected. In partic-
lar, most of these refer to basic financial literacy such as e.g.
nderstanding interest rates. As discussed above such variables
annot be effectively discriminate between Mzansi holders and
ndividuals with no financial access. The financial aspirations
an distinguish Mzansi from above, but not from below, and
ost of these omitted variables are essentially measuring such
ow level aspirations. Hence aspirations are important determi-
ants of the choice of the Mzansi intervention from an individual
oint of view, since it is much more important who they want to
e, rather than who they actually are.
The next two categories are the financial perceptions. Only
ne variable from the second grid is retained in the final
odel. Remembering that the second grid measure stated, as
pposed to acted upon perceptions (i.e. elicitated from their
ctual behaviour) in the first grid, this may simply reflect an
licitation problem. The unreliability of stated as opposed to
evealed preferences is not by any means a novel fact. The vari-
ble from grid 2 (i.e. stated perceptions) refers to that agreeing
ith the statement that young people know more about money
han older ones makes the choice of Mzansi more likely. This
nding is all but logical given that recent (and no so recent)
nnovations in banking have been linked to introduction of new
echnologies such as e-banking, (mobile) phone banking, ATMs
nd banking agents networks. Since older people find it more
ifficult to deal with technical innovations, particularly in more
raditional societies, such as assertion is to be expected.
The revealed perceptions show an interesting picture. There
re six selected variables from this category. This shows that on
ne hand revealed perceptions are related to (i.e. correlated to)
ther determinants of behaviour, something that lies at the core
f our conceptual model. This correlation forces the estimation
lgorithm to retain more variables from this category. Moreover,
he inclusion of so many variables from this particular category
eveals that the perceptions and attitudes are very important in
efining the decision to choose a given financial service (in this
ase Mzansi). The most influential (i.e. the one with the largest
oefficient) of these variables states that Mzansi holders gener-
lly agree with the statement (i.e. individuals agreeing with this
tatement are more likely to choose Mzansi) that money is to be
ithdrawn as soon as possible. This is consistent with the known
act that many Mzansi accounts are used mainly for receiving
ayments. This attitude to using Mzansi mainly as a vehicle for
eceiving money is very important in the structure of percep-
ions. Note, however, that although its relative effect is about
wice the effect of the next in terms of importance variable in
his category, it is not as dominant as one could have expected.
earing in mind that five more variables in this category with
roadly similar in terms of magnitude effects, this dominance
s somewhat reduced. One could speculate that a motivation to
velopm
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selection and supervised clustering of predictors with OSCAR. Biometrics
64, 115–123.
Chan, Y., Thakor, A., 1987. Collateral and competitive equilibria with moral
hazard and private information. J. Finance XLII (June (2)), 345–361.P. Kostov et al. / Review of De
ithdraw money as soon as possible could be a sign of liquidity
onstraints, that may be somewhat alleviated if incomes were
o improve. Such a conjecture, however, can only be properly
ested in a dynamic setting, which the cross-sectional dataset
e use here does not allow us to do. The other variables in this
ategory, however, tell a rather interesting story. Two of these
eveal a preference towards saving (‘you try to save regularly’
nd ‘you go without basic things so that you can save’). Fur-
hermore using informal channels for saving (using friends or
amily for safe-keeping money) reduces participation in Mzansi.
utting these together reveals a positive attitude for saving and
ncorporation into the formal financial services channels. This
reference towards saving is well defined in that putting together
ll the three effects above is commeasurable with the motiva-
ion for simply receiving payments. The next variable reveals
 small debt aversion effect. One would need to put the lat-
er in the wider context. Given the general debt awareness and
he actual phrasing of the statement: “If you don’t have enough
oney to pay all your debts, you pay one debt one month and
he next month you pay another debt”, the small coefficients
eflect more actual inability to realise debt reduction strategy,
ather than lack of desire to do so. This means that debt is seen
s a serious problem among Mzansi account holders. Together
ith the possible liquidity constraints, this could be a symptom
f a demand-side financial depression, possibly caused by the
ong-term supply-side driven exclusion from financial services.
herefore, the success of the Mzansi intervention may depend
rucially on the general economic situation and poverty allevi-
tion measures that reduce the indebtedness of the present and
uture customers. This suggests that not everything is doom and
loom with Mzansi. It provides a hint that it could, in princi-
le, become sustainable for the banks from financial point of
iew. Note however, that this would only be possible if these
references become realised, i.e. if a sufficient share of the
zansi population can afford to save and reduce indebtedness,
hich in turn depends on a number of other factors such as e.g.
conomic growth, employment opportunities, etc. Furthermore,
he relatively small in magnitude coefficients suggest that these
ffshoots of possible future financial sustainability are rather
ragile and could be shadowed by the present climate of finan-
ial austerity. Note that savings accumulation is one of the ways
o overcome type 2 credit rationing. Hence savings inclination
ould also indicate the presence of rationed demand. If this is
he case, their behaviour is tuned to overcome credit rationing
onstraints. We can therefore assume that the segment of the pop-
lation exhibiting such characteristics is long-term sustainable
nd potentially growth generating. This is an important result
hat deserves further investigation.
The last variable may appear slightly counterintuitive. It
efers to the fact that having a will makes one less likely
o opt into Mzansi. What is counterintuitive is not the
ffect itself, which is rather logical, but the actual inclusion
f this variable. This is a variable that suggests a higher
evel of financial planning, which logically viewed would
e characteristics of individuals with a better level of finan-
ial access. Hence this variable distinguishes Mzansi ‘from
bove’.
Cent Finance 5 (2015) 34–42 41
.  Conclusions
This paper investigated the determinants of demand for
nancial services with regard to the pre-entry Mzansi account
ntervention in South Africa. On its own and on average, tak-
ng into account the relative prominence of the latent motivations
nd attitudes that define its uptake, Mzansi does not look promis-
ng from both banks’ point of view and with regard to freeing a
reviously unrealised demand for financial services. However,
uch conclusions should not be surprising since it is a pre-entry
ccount. Our results hint for possible demand-side rationing, due
o long term exclusion from financial services. The elimination
f supply-side driven exclusion from finance via Mzansi can
herefore free such latent demand that cannot manifest itself in a
ross-sectional data setting. One need to take into account that it
s unreasonable to expect that all Mzansi account holders will be
he prime target for banks. The relative importance of the model
oefficients, however, suggests that such sustainability segments
xist.
Financial education brings customers into Mzansi. We find
o evidence that increasing the level of financial education
literacy) takes them further up to the financial access ladder.
owever, aspirations (which also can be translated in terms of
nancial educations) do move individuals up. It is reasonable to
ssume that providing (further) financial education can develop
nd foster such aspirations and move household up to the finan-
ial access ladder (and probably out of poverty). We find that
zansi holders, on the one hand, view the account, mainly as a
ehicle for receiving payments, but on the other hand, are moti-
ated to save. However, the real potential of Mzansi account
ies in enabling customers to moving up in the financial access
adder.
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